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Abstract
This article discusses the affect decay has within a systems approach used when implementing security strategies, in
particular, the theory of defence in depth. Defence in depth is implemented within a risk management framework to
reduce an organisation’s identified risks, which could lead to undesirable and unacceptable consequences. Defence in
depth aims to link layered security elements into a system to ensure a holistic and functional security system,
underpinned by the functions of; deter, detect, delay, response and recovery. For such a system to be commissioned and
maintain its commissioning effectiveness, these functions must be performed in their sequential order and within a
period of time, which is less than an adversary’s attack time.
This paper argues that such a relationship between the defence in depth elements requires an orderly relationship and
that factors which impede this orderliness, directly affects the security system as a whole. A method to understand such
deterioration of orderliness is the concept of entropy, referred to as the steady degradation of a system. Underpinned by
the characteristics of disorganisation and decay, a security system can become degraded through the reduction in
effectiveness of its individual components. Such degradation reduces the effectiveness of the whole system, considered
in this paper as entropic security decay. Within the risk management framework, it can be argued that as security decay
increases, risk reduction decreases and therefore, risk exposure increases.
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INTRODUCTION
The concept of risk management is well established in academic and organisational literature and to some degree, so is
security risk management; however, the effectiveness of security risk management has been questioned (Brooks, 2009).
Therefore, this paper discusses how security risk management may be implemented in a systems approach, using the
theory of defence in depth whilst considering the concept of entropy. It has been proposed that defence in depth
strategies can be impeded by the characteristics of disorganization and decay underpinning this concept. For an
organisation to maintain a sound security profile, all defence in depth elements and their constituents must be
maintained at their optimum level of performance. It is argued that security science should draw on the concept of
entropy to establish the concept of security decay. Security decay results in a reduction in overall system performance,
which should be avoided through the active monitoring and reviewing of treatment strategies.

STUDY OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this paper were to provide a framework that developed the term entropic security decay, providing a
definition for security decay, establishing where security decay integrates into the security risk management cycle and
stimulate academic discourse into the concept of security decay.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
In contemporary business, risk management is considered a significant management activity. Borgsdorf and Pliszka
(1999, p. 6) define it as “the planning, organising, leading and controlling of an organisation’s resources” to minimise
the potential of negative effects on the business activity. This approach is a formal systematic process (Hatfield &
Hipel, 2002, p. 1054) that is supported through Australian Standards in risk management (Standards Australia, 2004)
and security risk management (Standards Australia, 2006).
The risk management concept has been embraced by security management for planning how organisational resources
can be efficiently and effectively managed to reduce the chances of negative outcomes from breaches of security
programs (Broder, 2006, p. 25). Such a planning process in security management is, in general, referred to as security
risk management. In addressing risk concerns, Standards Australia HB167 Security Risk Management (2006, p. 63)
state that the key elements of organisational, community or individual security controls are those components which
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contribute to the management of risks through their ability to deter, detect, delay, respond and recover from attacks.
Therefore, a security risk management plan determines the level of treatment controls required, based on a facility’s risk
rating and are implemented in accordance with the theory of defence in depth (Garcia, 2001).

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The security industry, both government and commercial, rely on the application of security risk management. Security
risk management is unique from other forms of risk management, where many of the more generic risk models lack key
concepts necessary for effective design, application and risk mitigation (Brooks, 2009, p. 1). Nevertheless, within the
context of security risk management it is expected that characteristics that may make an organisation more prone to
entropic security decay can be identified and measured. Once these characteristics are understood, this will allow the
use of stimulus funding to maintain the effectiveness of various security risk mitigation strategies.

DEFENCE IN DEPTH
Security, as a discipline, collectively embraces a historically consistent strategy towards preventing theft, destruction of
facilities, the protection of personnel and information, referred to as defence in depth. As such, the underlying theory for
this study was defence in depth, comprising of various elements such as deterrence, detection, delay, response and
recovery. This strategy has been applied to the protection of assets for centuries, based on the argument that a protected
asset should be enclosed by a succession of barriers that restricts penetration of unauthorised access to provide time for
an appropriate response (Smith, 2003, p. 8) and to facilitate recovery.
The theory of defence in depth aims to link layered security elements into a system incorporating; people, technology,
barriers and procedures, to ensure a holistic and functional security system (Smith, 2003, p. 8). This system delivers
effective risk based decisions, enhanced operational effectiveness and a reduction in overall risks and costs (Trusted
Information Sharing Network, 2008, p. 2).
Defence in depth is employed in security risk management using a systems approach (Garcia, 2001, p. 6), based on a
cost benefit analysis framework (Manunta, 2007). A system can be defined as an “integrated collection of components
or elements designed to achieve an objective according to plan” (Garcia, 2001, p. 6). Fennelly (1997, p. 59) supports a
systems approach to security arguing that maximum security is a concept, whereas alarm systems, physical barriers,
guard forces and other components of a security system do not individually achieve security. Therefore, a systems
approach includes the component resources of people, techniques, procedures, design features, materials and
educational programs integrated to construct a security program (Post, Kingsbury & Schachtsiek, 1991, p. 23). The
combination of such resources may be integrated to form a physical protection system.
The objective of a physical protection system (PPS) is to eliminate accomplishment of a malevolent overt or covert
action, preventing sabotage of critical equipment, theft of assets or information and the protection of people. In line with
the theory of defence in depth, for a PPS to meet these objectives there must be an awareness that an attack is underway
(detection), the slowing of an adversary’s progress to the target (delay) and enough time for the response force to
interrupt or stop the adversaries (response) before they achieve their goal (Figure 1).
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Figure 1 Functions of a physical protection system
(Garcia, 2006, p. 34)
Relationship of physical protection system functions
The interrelationships between the functions of the PPS commence with the element of detection, which begins on
receipt of the first alarm and concludes with accurate assessment. The delay function must slow-down an adversary to
allow a response force enough time to deploy and interject the adversary. This delay time must be less than the
adversary’s task or attack time, which is the total time required for the adversary to accomplish their desired goal
(Figure 2).

Figure 2 Interrelationships of physical protection system functions
(Garcia, 2006, p. 39)
For example, a sensor first activates at time TO, but the time when the alarm is assessed as valid is TA. From these
points in time, the location of the alarm must be communicated to the response force. The time at which the response
force interrupts the adversary is labelled TI and the adversary task completion time is TC. For a PPS to accomplish its
objective of interrupting an adversary, TI must occur before TC. In addition, detection should occur as early as possible
and TO, TA and TI should be as far to the left on the time axis as possible (Garcia, 2006, pp. 37-38).

AN ENTROPIC APPROACH TO DEFENCE IN DEPTH
Defence in depth has historically shown its effectiveness for security concerns (Smith, 2003, p. 8); however, King
(2008, p. 1) warns such security controls inevitably degrades over time. Such degradation results in a security system
suffering from natural entropy. The concept of entropy is derived from a physics metric, defined as a measure of
disorder in a system and a process characterised with decay, disintegration, running down and disorder (Bohm & Peat,
2000, p. 137; Herman, 1999, p. 86). Such system degradation reduces efficiency and effectiveness (Bohm & Peat, 2000,
p. 137). According to Callister (1997, p. 482) entropy increases with increasing disorder; however, the concept of
entropy is a tremendously difficult physics concept to grasp when considering disorganisation and decay in various
types of systems (Lovey & Manohar, 2007, p. 99; Styer, 2000, p. 1).
Herman (1999, p. 86) broadly defines entropy as the steady degradation of a system — where entropy increases within a
system, capability decreases — based on the argument that systems rely on order and cohesion. The laws of physics
states disorder must always increase, as in classical physics the laws of nature are perfectly time-reversible, where all of
the processes people see occurring do so in one direction only. Reversal would go against the laws of statistical
probabilities, referred to as the second law of thermodynamics (Felder, 2001, p. 1). Total entropy of the universe can
never decrease, as according to Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99) this law states that transformations of one form of
energy into another in natural process is accompanied by a loss because of increasing entropy. The science of
thermodynamics enables the quantity known as entropy to be measured objectively in terms of the amount of heat and
work that is associated with a system, as left to itself a physical system tends to maximise its entropy in-line with the
laws of thermodynamics (Lovey & Manohar, 2007, p. 99; Styer, 2000, p. 1).
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Maximum entropy is associated with a systems inability to carry out work, transfer useful energy from one region to
another or in any other way, and generate global orders of activity. Motz and Weaver (1989, p. 168) suggests that all
systems strive towards disorder, which when achieved the system will be in a state of equilibrium. Complete
equilibrium in a system results in the death of the system.

SECURITY SYSTEM ENTROPIC DECAY
A security system is only as good as its parts; when a single part fails, this failure can cause degradation within the total
system (Konicek & Little, 1997, p. 184: King, 2008, p. 1). Garcia (2006) concurs, suggesting that system effectiveness
can become degraded through the reduction in effectiveness of individual components.
As such, this paper has used the concept of entropy to discuss the decaying effects on a physical protection system
(PPS), in-line with King’s (2008, p. 1) assertion that security systems inevitably degrade over time due to natural
entropy. However, according to Denbigh (2009, p. 4) for entropy to have an effect on a system it must have initially
been considered orderly, where orderliness is capable of being quantitatively stated. For a system to be defined as
orderly, it’s elements must be appropriately distributed in space and/or time, where the rule of orderliness states that a
set of three or more objects will display a certain orderliness if they exist in a linear arrangement, for example objects
A, B and C. In this context, the objects obey the rule as B is to the right of A, and C is to the right of B, etc. In addition,
the same objects will display the kind of orderliness if a relationship also exists between successive separations AB,
BC, AC, etc., resulting in a more comprehensive state of order.
It is argued that entropy relates to a security system as the defence in depth functions must be performed in their
sequential order and within a period of time, which is less than the time required for the adversary to complete their task
(Garcia, 2001, p. 6). These functional requirements of defence in depth are distributed in space and/or time according to
Denbigh’s (2009, p. 4) entropy rule. The available literature indicates that the space and time distribution of the defence
in depth elements create a comprehensive state of order in relation to a PPS macro level of effectiveness. The micro
states within defence in depth include the constituents within the elements of deter, detect, delay, and response, which
may be considered a linear arrangement (Denbigh, 2009, p. 4; Garcia, 2001, p. 6). Deterrence (element A) is linear to
detection (element B), which is linear to delay (element C) followed by a linear response (element D), nevertheless,
linearity does not confer equality.
Orderliness also exists within a PPS (Denbigh, 2009, p. 4) for example, deterrence. Deterrence is achieved by altering
the cost benefit analysis of a rational choosing adversary (Singh, 2005). Within a PPS each function of the defence in
depth strategy within this linear relationship must be achieved in their sequential order, achieving deterrence through
systematic application of detect, delay, response (Garcia, 2006, p. 240) and recovery, in this sequential combination.
This systematic combination aims to communicate to potential adversaries that the risks outweigh the benefits,
influencing their (however rudimentary) cost benefit equation (Clarke & Cornish, 1987, p. 934). Deterrence is related to
an adversary’s chances of being detected (B), the difficulty in achieving their goal (C), and the chances of getting
caught (D). Therefore, deterrence has an orderly relationship with all other elements within a PPS, being D*BCD.
Another orderliness relationship exists between response (D) and detection (B). Response is an organisation’s means of
interrupting an adversary before they achieve their goal; however, for response to be achieved there must be knowledge
that an attack is underway (detection). Therefore a relationship exists between response and detection, namely D*B.
Further, delay is the means by which the facility provides their response force with enough time to interrupt an
adversary. Therefore, delay has an additional kind of orderly relationship with response, C*D.
In addition, each element of defence in depth has a vertical relationship with its constituents, which combined provides
the specific capability for that element within the linear relationship. For the system of defence in depth to be effective,
the relationships between the constituents and elements must be orderly and each constituent must be at its desired level
of effectiveness.
This paper argues that the macro state of the defence in depth system is recognised as an expression of the average of
the microstate variables collectively, where changes in microstates (defence in depth constituent elements) directly
affect the macro state. Such a process is based on the definition of entropy offered by Bohm and Peat (2000, p. 137),
where disorder within and between elements increases, decay increases and capability decreases.

ENTROPIC SECURITY DECAY DEFINED
Entropy can be quantitatively stated for defence in depth, using its traditional effectiveness measure. The effectiveness
measure of a physical protection system (PPS) is the principle of timely detection; therefore, the macro-state of a PPS
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can be represented as its probability of interruption (Pi). Pi is the probability of interruption or the cumulative
probability of detection where there is enough time remaining for the response force to interrupt the adversaries. For a
PPS, the higher the probability of interruption (Pi) the lower the chances of a successful penetration; whereas, the lower
the Pi the higher the chances of penetration (Garcia, 2001, p. 246). The PPS can be analysed using the EASI model
(Garcia, 2001), where input parameters representing the PPS functions of detection, delay and response are required.
This model demonstrates the relationship among the performance measures of the PPS constituents, represented by the
following input parameters:


Ps = probability that individual detection constituents will sense abnormal or unauthorised activities;



Pd = the product of the probability that the detection constituents will sense abnormal or unauthorised
activities, Pd represents the element of detection;



Pt = the probability that the alarm indication will be transmitted to an evaluation or assessment point;



Pa = the probability of accurate assessment;



Pc = probability of guard communication;



Mean and standard deviation of delay time;



Mean and standard deviation of response time.

These measures are the cumulative sum of the various subsystems within a PPS, where any changes in these inputs have
an overall effect on the output (probability of interruption). Therefore, changes in the microstates have a direct effect on
the macrostate of the PPS. For example, the small effects in the microstates when calculating the probability of
interruption using EASI adversary path analysis (Table 1).
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Table 1 Adversary path comparison
Condition 1 (Table 1) indicates a Pi of 90% (very high chance of interruption) after entering the microstate data.
However, condition 2 indicates a much lower Pi after making small changes in the system’s microstates, as a result of a
detection sensors reduced effectiveness due to decay resulting in a higher nuisance alarm rate and by slight increases in
response time due to decay in the facilities response capability. Condition 2 (Table 2) indicates a Pi of just 53%
(medium chance of interruption).

Condition

PD

PD

PD

Pcomms

Mdelay

Mdelay SD

Mrespond

Mrespond SD

(secs)

(secs)

(sec)

(sec)

1

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.95

332

99.6

200

60.0

2

0.5

0.9

0.9

0.95

332

99.6

300

90.0

3

0.5

0.9

0.9

0.50

332

99.6

300

99.6

4

0.9

0.9

0.9

0.95

452

135.6

300

90.0

Table 2 Physical protection system microstate data
Condition 3 (Table 1) indicates how the probability of interruption can be further reduced with a change in the facility’s
probability of communication due to decay in the communications system. This condition shows Pi of just 28% (Table
2); however, with small changes in the systems microstates through correcting the detection fault, slightly increasing the
facility’s mean delay time and correcting the communication systems degradation, condition 4 shows (Table 1) an
increased Pi of 84% (high chance of interruption) after entering the microstate data (Table 2). These examples
demonstrate that the systems constituents have a direct influence on its Pi (macrostate), establishing a time penetration
continuum.
The concept of entropy is becoming increasingly popular and used to discuss the state of various systems, including
information security systems (King, 2008), organisational systems (Lovey & Nadkarni, 2007) and combat systems
(Herman, 1999). However, the meaning of entropy is difficult to define and not well understood outside of academic
circles, leading to ubiquitous usage and minimal general understanding. Whilst various definitions and understandings
are applied to entropy, a central theme is how various components of a system relate to one another towards producing a
coherent whole.
As such, this paper has argued that the concept of entropy provides a framework towards measuring the gradual
degradation of a physical protection system after it’s commissioning, reducing its effectiveness. However, given the
ubiquitous usage of entropy, limited understanding and definitional ambiguity, this paper argues that the term security
decay become adopted to represent the measure of degradation within a PPS. The adoption of security decay will
provide functional definition and therefore, appeal to both security academics and practitioners alike. The paper has
proposed that security decay be defined as:
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The gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents), or the gradual degradation in the
relationship between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system.
Such a definition provides rigour and genuine conceptual substance that can be integrated into a physical protection
systems performance measure. In addition, such an approach may also be applied to personnel and information security
frameworks to encompass the security management functions.

ENTROPIC SECURITY DECAY AND SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT
In general, security risk management is considered an important aspect in the function of security management. Why,
how and where resources may be directed is often informed by security risk management (Brooks, 2009). Therefore, the
concept of security decay has to be embedded within security risk management. As Lovey and Manohar (2007, p. 99)
suggest, various systems suffer from entropy and therefore, organisations must understand that for a system to operate
efficiently they must continually invest in resources to maintain system adequacy to reduce natural entropy. King (2008,
p. 1) supported this view, stating that it is the gradual erosion of seemingly minor security controls that eventually lead
to major incidents. As such, the security risk management cycle has to, in some form, incorporate the decaying of risk
reduction strategies (Figure 3).

Establish
Context
Energise:
Defence in Depth

Security
Intelligence
Security Risk
Management

Monitor
Review

and

Security Decay

Risk Analysis

Risk
Mitigation:
Implement DiD

Figure 3 Security risk management cycle, with security decay
(Adjusted from the Trusted Information Sharing Network, 2008, p. 4)
In essence, the security risk management cycle (Figure 3) may have the component of security decay in-built, through
the Monitor and Review process; however, there are discrete benefits in understanding security decay as a discrete
function. Whilst the concept of security decay has been considered by Underwood (1984) and McClure (1997), there is
a dearth of knowledge relating to the gradual degradation of security controls. The concept of security decay is an area
suitable for continued development and research, a view put forward by this paper is that the concept of entropic
security decay becomes adopted by both industry and academia. In addition, the study recommends future research to
be undertaken towards establishing support for the concept entropic security decay, focusing on quantitatively defining
entropic decay characteristics within the physical protection system, and developing organisational measures and
indicators.

CONCLUSION
This paper has used the physics metric known as entropy to explain how various systems, including security systems,
can be reduced in their efficiency and effectiveness when they, their component elements, or constituents become
disordered, run-down, degraded or decayed. Entropy is associated with a system’s inability to carry out work, transfer
useful energy or maintain orders of activity, and all systems strive towards disorder that when achieved, are in a state of
equilibrium or death.
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In considering defence in depth, the concept of entropic security decay has been presented. Defence in depth is the sum
of various elements, namely deterrence, detection, delay, response and recovery. The concept of entropy supported the
argument that any change in the efficiency and effectiveness of any of the defence in depth elements reduces the
system’s effectiveness. The sum of these concepts collectively form and were referred to as security decay, being
defined as the gradual degradation of the microscopic quantities (constituents) or the gradual degradation in the
relationship between the microscopic and macroscopic quantities within a security system.
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